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I. OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN
CHINA (SINCE 1985)
A. TRANSPARENCY IN VILLAGES AND ENTERPRISES
One of the most important consequences of China’s economic
reform, which began in its rural provinces in 1978, is the practice of
transparency.1 Disclosure of information related to public affairs first
occurred in 1985, when Villagers’ Committees (“VCs”)—
autonomous organizations that manage the public affairs of
villages 2 —made fiscal, land use, and home planning records
available to interested villagers.3 Despite the adoption of open village
affairs by several provinces, including Jiangsu, Shandong, and
Henan, the practice was not codified until much later, when, in late
2004, the General Office of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China (“CPC”) and the General Office of the
1. For more information on these reforms, see Jinglian Wu, Understanding
and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform 104-27 (2005) (discussing, among
other things, the adoption of “contracting” and “responsibility”).
2. Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa ( 村 民 委 员 会 组 织 法 ) [Law on the
Organization of Villagers’ Committees] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 1998, effective Nov. 4, 1998) art. 2 (China),
translated in http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/23223/23228/22926.htm.
3. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzheng bu jiceng zhengquan he shequ
jianshe si (中华人民共和国民政部基层政权和社区建设司) [Bureau of BasicLevel Admin. & Cmty. Constr.], Quanguo xietiao xiaozu bangongshi (全国协调小
组办公室) [Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs], Cun wu gongkai (村务公开) [Open
Village Affairs] 11-12 (2004).
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State Council issued the Notice on Open Village Affairs and
Democratic Management in the Countryside, “proving” its “positive
achievements.” 4 The Notice also included suggestions on how to
perfect open administration of village affairs, demonstrating a desire
by the government and the governing political party to push
transparency forward after nearly ten years of “self-governance” on
the issue.5 Transparency in rural areas progressed remarkably, lifting
the “Bamboo Curtain” on public affairs from autonomous villages
and then government administration.
In the late 1990s, transparency spread from rural to urban areas,
affecting state-owned and collectively owned enterprises (“SOEs”
and “COEs,” respectively)6 as well as other public organizations. As
a confirmation of the pioneering wave of open government affairs
and as a guide to the future operation of transparency, the General
Offices of the CPC Central Committee and of the State Council
promulgated the Notice on Further Openness in the Affairs of SOEs,
COEs, and Their Holding Companies on June 3, 2002. 7 Later that
4. See Guanyu Jianquan Wanshan Cunwu Gongkai He Minzhu Guanli Zhidu
de Yijian (关于健全完善村务公开和民主管理制度的意见) [Notice on Open
Village Affairs and Democratic Management in the Countryside] (promulgated by
the Gen. Offices of the Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China [CPC] &
the St. Council, June 22, 2004, effective June 22, 2004) [hereinafter Notice on
Open Village Affairs], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/200407/12/content_1591421.htm.
5. See id. (outlining procedures to improve rural governance by creating a
group to monitor and implement “village affairs,” as well as to give farmers a
voice in decisions regarding land use, land transfer, and financing, among others).
6. See Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui Shuji Wei Jianxing Daibiao
Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui Changwu Weiyuanhui Suozuo De Gongzuo
Baogao(中央纪律检查委员会书记尉健行代表中央纪律检查委员会常务委员会
所作的工作报告) [CPC Comm’n for Discipline Inspection], “Jia da lidu, biaoben
jianzhi, tuidong fan fubai douzheng shenru kaizhan” de gongzuo baogao (《加大
力度，标本兼治，推动反腐败斗争深入开展》 的工作报告) [1998 Annual
Report] (delivered by Sec’y Wei Jianxing on Jan. 13, 1999), reprinted in THE
PEOPLE’S DAILY, Mar. 1, 1999, at 3, available at http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/channel1/11/20000804/172106.html.
7. See Guangyu Zai Guoyou Qiye, Jiti Qi Ye Ji Qi Konggu Qiye Shenru
Shixing Changwu Gongkai Zhidu de Tongzhi (关于在国有企业、集体企业及其
控股企业深 入实行厂务公开制度的通知) [Notice on Further Openness in the
Affairs of State-Owned Enterprises, Collectively Owned Enterprises and Their
Holding Companies] (promulgated by the CPC Cent. Comm. & the St. Council,
June
3,
2002,
effective
June
3,
2002),
available
at
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/
2002/content_61564.htm
(mandating
publication of all development plans as well as reform and merger proposals, and
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same year, the National Panel on Coordination of Open Enterprise
Affairs estimated that over 250,000 enterprises, including over
190,000 public organizations (SOEs and COEs) 8 as well as over
57,000 private enterprises, had introduced transparent management.9
The first official statement on government transparency appeared
in 1988, when the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee
proposed disclosure of all administrative regulations, procedures, and
decisions in preparation for democracy. 10 By the late 1990s some
laws and regulations began to contain principles of openness.11 In his
1997 report to the Fifteenth National Convention of the CPC Central
Committee, then-General Secretary Jiang Zemin stressed the
“principles of fairness, justice and openness.” 12 Thereafter, the
other similar events, so that workers can participate in the decision-making).
8. See generally 2002 Nian chang wu gongkai dashiji (2002 年厂务公开大事
记) [Chronicle of Events in Factory Affairs, 2002], QUANGUO CHANG WU GONGKAI
MINZHU GUANLI WANG ( 全 国 厂 务 公 开 民 主 管 理 网 ) [THE NETWORK FOR
DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT ] (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.cwgk.org/template/
10001/file.jsp?cid=10&aid=8.
9. Id.
10. See LIU JIE (刘杰), ZHIQING QUAN YU XINXI GONGKAI FA (知情权与信息公
开 法 ) [THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND LAWS ON INFORMATION DISCLOSURE] 246
(2005).
11. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa (中华人民共和国行
政 处 罚 法 ) [Law on Administrative Penalty] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996) (China), translated in 1996 P.R.C.
LAWS art. 4, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/11/content_ 1383613.htm (“Administrative Penalty shall be imposed in
adherence to the principles of fairness and openness . . . . Regulations on
administrative penalty to be imposed for violations of law must be published; those
which are not published shall not be taken as the basis for administrative
penalty.”). Article 31 requires parties to be notified of both “the facts, grounds and
basis on which the administrative penalties are to be decided” and the rights of
remedy which are required before a decision of penalty is imposed. In addition,
Articles 42 and 43 of the Law provide a right to and prescribe a procedure for
public hearings. The Temporary Regulations on State Civil Servants also stated the
principle of openness in the employment of civil servants. See Temporary
Regulations on State Civil Servants, art. 2 (promulgated by the St. Council in
1993, superseded by the Civil Servants Law on Jan. 1, 2006).
12. Jiang Zemin ( 江 泽 民 ), Pres., Report at the 15th Nat’l Cong. of the
Communist Party of China: Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping
Theory, for an All-Around Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics in the 21st Century (江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国
代表大会上的报告：高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，把建设有中国特色社会主义
事 业 全 面 推 向 二 十 一 世 纪 ) 12 (Sept. 12, 1997), translated in
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.htm, available at http://news.
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practice of open government started to blossom throughout the
country, almost simultaneously with the assistance of “egovernment.”13
Government transparency and economic reform in modern China,
as a consequence of the earlier reforms in rural China, is no
coincidence. Transparent administration of government affairs, a
prerequisite for public participation and oversight, 14 is a basic
necessity of market economies. Later practice of transparency in
SOEs and COEs also evinces the link between economic reform and
information disclosure. Managers of both villages and firms
distributed information related to fiscal and administrative affairs to
their members to meet the demands of democratic management and,
therefore, to make villagers or workers more productive.15 However,
the consequences of transparency experiments in economic matters
went well beyond the bounds of economic affairs, penetrating public
organizations and, eventually, administrative agencies.

B. LOCAL EXPERIMENTS
The Rules on Open Government Information of Guangzhou
Municipality (“2003 Guangzhou Rules”)16 are generally credited as
the first official legislation on open government information
(“OGI”). Although the city of Guangzhou did spawn the government
xinhuanet.com/zilia/2003-01/20content_697189.htm.
13. See LIU supra note 10, at 247-48 (reporting a surge in laws and judicial
decisions supporting the need for government transparency).
14. See Notice on Open Village Affairs, supra note 4, § 1. In fact, in the early
1980s, attempts at open village affairs were always followed by public
participation and supervision. See LUOPING HAN (罗平汉), CUNMIN ZIZHI SHI (村
民 自 治 史 ) [HISTORY OF VILLAGERS’ SELF-GOVERNANCE] 112-16 (2006)
(describing the implementation of open village affairs in various provinces in
China).
15. See Notice on Open Village Affairs, supra note 4, § 3 (elaborating on
openness as precondition of villagers participation and supervision).
16. Guangzhou Shi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Guiding (广州市政府信息公开规
定 ) [Rules on Open Government Information of Guangzhou Municipality]
(promulgated by Executive Order No. 8, Nov. 6, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003)
(China),
http://www.people.com.cn/item/flfgk/dffg/1992/D442053199204.html
[hereinafter 2003 Guangzhou Rules], available at http://www.freedominfo.org/
documents/provisions.pdf (Jamie P. Horsley, Yale Law Sch. trans.) (stating that
the law was formulated specifically “to protect the right to know . . . , standardize
the making public of government information, [and] increase the transparency of
administrative activities”).
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transparency movement, this actually happened ten years prior to the
2003 Guangzhou Rules—in 1992. The Temporary Rules on Open
Government of Guangzhou Municipality (“1992 Temporary
Rules”)17 not only confirmed early transparency efforts undertaken
by government agencies (albeit without binding legal effect), but also
provided supporting authority for future administrative action. The
Rules defined “open government” (Article 3), delineated the scope of
openness (Article 7), and prescribed basic procedures for openness
(Articles 9 to 20).18
With more than ten years of experimental practice, the Guangzhou
municipal government was well prepared to take the leap to the 2003
Guangzhou Rules.19 For the first time in China’s history, the “right to
know” was provided formally by statute.20 The principle of openness
was also proclaimed. 21 The 2003 Guangzhou Rules set forth two
means of information disclosure: agencies may release governmentheld information upon their own initiative 22 or upon request. 23
Moreover, agencies should disclose requested information unless

17. Guangzhou Shi Renmin Zhengfu Gongkai Zhengwu Huodong Shixing
Banfa (广州市人民政府公开政务活动试行办法) [Temporary Rules on Open
Government of Guangzhou Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No.
67, July 9, 1992, effective July 9, 1992, expired Jan. 1, 2003) (China), available at
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1200/21752/21754/21766/21791/2006/4/pa240
55224334600212000-0.htm (Chinese version). The Rules were abolished on
January 1, 2003, the day on which the 2003 Guangzhou Rules came into effect.
18. See id. arts. 3, 7, 9-20.
19. No official translation into English yet exists for the 2003 Guangzhou
Rules. The Chinese version is available at the official website of the Guangzhou
Municipal Government: http://www.gz.gov.cn/vfs/content/newcontent.jsp?content
Id=233199&catId=4099. For an introduction to and commentary on the Rules in
English, see Jamie P. Horsely, Guangzhou’s Pioneering Foray into Open
Government, CHINA BUS. REV., July-Aug., 2003, available at www.chinabusiness
review.com/public/0307/horsely.html (using the SARS epidemic as an example of
China’s continued struggle against its culture of secrecy and renewed commitment
to transparency).
20. 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, art. 1 (describing the protection of
the “right to know” as a purpose of this statute).
21. Id. art. 6.1 (providing the general rule that government information shall be
made public).
22. Id. arts. 9-11 (obligating disclosure of government decisions, for example,
procedures, resolution of major matters, finances, and government personnel).
23. Id. art. 13.1 (allowing persons to request the disclosure of information not
listed in Articles 9 through 11).
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such disclosure is clearly prohibited by law.24
The 2003 Guangzhou Rules gave rise to a new round of the local
transparency movement. The cities of Shenzhen, Chengdu, Shanghai,
Chongqing, Wuhan, Datong, Hangzhou, Changchun, and Ningbo
followed up successively the following year by promulgating similar
rules or regulations; provinces also joined this wave of OGI
legislation, thus making 2004 the “year of government
transparency.”25 These rules and regulations served as the main legal
authority for disclosure of government information by local
government until 2008, when the central government promulgated a
new regulation, discussed below in Part II.

C. INFLUENCES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to domestic motivations for government transparency,
where economic factors yielded a legal-political result, international
law also significantly influenced China’s march towards
transparency. On one hand, access to the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) pushed, if not triggered, Chinese OGI legislation at both
the local and the national level; on the other hand, experiences of
other countries also provided examples for China to reference when
considering reforms.
1. WTO Regulations
As China approached its accession to the WTO in the late 1990s,
its study of the WTO extended beyond academia; the officers and
staff of nearly every government agency were busy educating
themselves about the WTO. When people began to view the WTO
Agreements from a legal perspective, rather than a “purely
economic” one, the obligations that the WTO might impose on the
Chinese government, and the legal consequences arising therefrom,
attracted public attention. Scholars, and later officers, began to
realize that the WTO’s influence would inevitably affect many
aspects of Chinese administrative law even though the WTO
24. Id.
25. For detailed information of local legislation of government information
disclosure, see generally LIU WENJING (刘文静), WTO TOUMINGDU YUANZE YU
WOGUO XINGZHENG GONGKAI ZHIZU (WTO 透明度原则与我国行政公开制度)
[THE WTO PRINCIPLE OF TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA’S INSTITUTION OF OPEN
GOVERNMENT] 40-50 (2008).
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Agreements were originally written to regulate only domestic laws
relating to international trade. 26 It became evident that it is almost
impossible to differentiate between laws and regulations relating to
international trade from those not, especially because a WTO
Member’s government must adjust its domestic legislation to
“comply” with its WTO obligations. 27 The WTO principle of
transparency, for example, has played a major role in the reform of
Chinese administrative law. The principle, found in almost every
covered agreement, was enunciated in Article 2(C)(1) of Protocol on
the Accession on the People’s Republic of China 28 and later
interpreted in Article 324 of the Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China.29 In carrying out reform, China sought to ensure
the compliance of legislation closely related to international trade
(for example, the 2003 Law on Government Procurement)30 as well
26. See LIU WENJING (刘文静), WTO GUIZE GUONEI SHISHI DE XINGZHENGFA
WENTI (WTO 规则国内实施的行政法问题) [IMPLEMENTING WTO REGULATIONS
IN CHINA: ITS INFLUENCES ON CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 48-56 (2004). This
book discusses the influences of WTO regulations on important aspects of Chinese
administrative law, including uniform administration and allocation of
administrative powers, transparency, standard and scope of judicial review, and
administrative licensing, viewing WTO regulations as “international administrative
law.” Id. chs. 1, 3-6.
27. See Donald C. Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for
Compliance, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 97, 98 (2003) (noting that law
professors have welcomed the pressures that WTO membership imposes on
transparency because it moves China’s government to a more limited and
transparent form).
28. See World Trade Organization [WTO], Protocol on the Accession of the
People’s Republic of China, ¶ 2(C)(1), WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.
pdf (permitting China to enforce only the “laws, regulations and other measures
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign
exchange” that are published or made available to other WTO Members,
individuals, and enterprises).
29. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China, ¶ 324, WT/MIN(01)/3 (Nov. 10, 2001), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan002144.pdf
(alleging that, at this point in the accession process, China’s laws have not reached
the level of transparency necessary to comply with the WTO Agreement and Draft
Protocol, and encouraging China to use the Internet to make its laws publicly
available).
30. See Yao Zhenyan (姚振炎), Vice Chairman, Fin. Econ. Comm., Nat’l
People’s Cong., Address at the 9th Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm.,
“Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Caigou Fa (Caoan) de
Shuoming” ( 关 于 《 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 政 府 采 购 法 ( 草 案 ) 的 说 明 》 )
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as general legislation on government transparency (for example, the
2003 Guangzhou Rules).31 The influence of the WTO Agreement can
be seen not only in the “General Provisions” chapter of a particular
statute, where the principle of openness or transparency is
articulated, 32 but also in local legislation on government
transparency.
2. Experiences of Other Countries
The implementation and practice of government transparency in
China has been influenced greatly by other countries’ experiences.
With the introduction of statutes on administrative procedure by tens
of other countries (many of them were translated into Chinese by
scholars) since the late 1990s, and with the important role played by
academic experts at almost all levels of legislation, the experience of
other countries has been merged into newly established Chinese laws
and regulations related to government transparency, as well as to
other aspects of administrative procedure. Legislators and officers,
often lacking legal expertise, sought help from professors more and
more frequently in drafting bills. 33 When a bill dealt with the
procedure of public participation, law professors and other legal
experts would offer comments and suggestions that were informed
by foreign experiences. Sometimes, foreign experts made
suggestions directly. Perhaps the best example is the collaboration
[Interpretation of the Government Procurement Law (Draft)] (Oct. 22, 2001),
available at http://www.law-lib.com/fzdt/newshtml/20/20050710215503.htm
(mentioning the impact of the WTO on Chinese procurement).
31. See Guangzhou Municipal Gov’t, Legal Affairs Office, Introduction to
Open Government Information Work by the Guangzhou Municipal Government, 23
GOV’T INFO. Q. 1, 11 (Mar. 20, 2006) (noting that comprehensive compliance with
WTO requirements necessitates openness of government information).
32. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Caigou Fa (中华人民共和国
政府采购法) [Law on Government Procurement] (promulgated by Presidential
Order No. 68, June 29, 2002, effective Jan. 1, 2003), translated in 2002 P.R.C.
LAWS, available at http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/08/content_75023
.htm (prescribing that “[g]overnment procurement shall be conducted in line with
the principle of openness, transparency” (Article 3) and that “[b]id invitation and
tendering activities shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of
openness” (Article 5)).
33. Anne Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting Legislation for
Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 1 (1996)
(commenting on the use of American lawyers in drafting twenty-two laws for the
People’s Republic of China under the United Nations Development Programme).
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between the Office of Legislative Affairs of Guangzhou Municipal
Government and The China Law Center of Yale Law School, who
together drafted the Guangzhou Municipal Measures on Public
Participation in Formulating Rules in 2005.34

II. THE STATE COUNCIL’S OGI REGULATIONS
Promulgated by China’s State Council in 2008, the Regulations on
Open Government Information (“State OGI Regulations”) summed
up the experiences of earlier local legislation, establishing a uniform
procedure for administration of OGI for localities and administrative
agencies. 35 While the State OGI Regulations are clearly far from
perfect, they nonetheless stands as a striking mark for further steps
toward government transparency.

34. Legal experts who collaborated at the July 2006 workshop titled “Public
Participation in Rulemaking,” in Guangzhou, China, July 2006, include: Professors
Jamie P. Horsley and Jeffrey P. Prescott of The China Law Center, Yale Law
School; Professor Jeffrey S. Lubbers of the Washington College of Law, American
University; Mr. Neil Eisner, Assistant General Counsel for Regulation and
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Transportation; as well as several Chinese law
professors, including the author of this article. For a brief introduction to this
collaboration, see Is China’s Government Becoming More Open?: An Interview
with Jamie Horsley, Deputy Director of The China Law Center at Yale Law School
(Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/3061.htm
(remarking that Guangzhou Province’s experimental use of “both open information
and public participation mechanisms [was] adapted in part from U.S. practice”).
See generally Guangzhoshi Guizhang Zhiding Gongzhong Canyu Banfa (广州市
规章制定公众参与办法) [Measure on Public Participation in Formulating Rules
of Guangzhou Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No. 4, June 27,
2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) art. 1 (China) (The China Law Center trans.),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual _Life/CL-PPFinal_GZ_PP_MeasuresFinal__tr9-4-09_%28Eng%29.pdf (“These measures are
formulated in order to promote and standardize the work of public participation in
the course of formulating rules . . . .”).
35. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli (中华人民
共 和 国 政 府 信 息 公 开 条 例 ) [Regulations on Open Government Information]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 17, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) (China)
[hereinafter State OGI Regulations], available at http://www.greenlaw.org.cn/
files/laws/State%20Council%20Information%20Disclosure%20Regs.pdf.
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A. ACHIEVEMENTS
1. Special Office for OGI Works
The State OGI Regulations prescribe that special offices for OGI
work—being designed by local governments and their departments at
the county level and above—undertake specific OGI matters,
maintain and update government information, organize the
compilation of OGI guides and annual reports, and conduct
examinations for secrecy for the administrative agency to which the
special office belongs.36 The establishment of special offices for OGI
in fact made government information disclosure more convenient
and smoother, as well as more standardized and, thus, more easily
supervised.
2. Scope of Disclosure
Local rules on OGI, before the 2008 State Regulations, differed in
listing the assorted information that should be disclosed. Those
differences were actually due to the myriad confusing ways of
classifying government information. For example, some local rules
classified very specific administrative decisions such as “requisition
of land [and] documents about house demolition,” 37 or “series
numbers of permits for the Middle School Entrance Exam and
University Entrance Exam, and the scores of the examinees.” 38
36. See id. art. 4.
37. See Shanghaishi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Guiding (上海市政府信息公开
规 定 ) [Rules on Open Government Information of Shanghai Municipality]
(promulgated by Executive Order No. 19, Jan. 20, 2004, effective May 1, 2004)
art. 8(B)(3) (China) (The China Law Ctr. trans.), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Shanghai_Municipal_Provisions.pdf; see
also Chengdushi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Zanxing Guiding (成都市政府信息公开
规 定 ) [Rules on Open Government Information of Chengdu Municipality]
(promulgated by Executive Order No. 105, Mar. 29, 2004, effective May 1, 2004)
art. 10(9) (China); Wuhanshi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Guiding (武汉市人民政府
信 息公开 暂行规定 ) [Temporary Rules on Open Government Information of
Wuhan Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No. 156, May 31, 2004,
effective July 1, 2004) art. 7(2)(4) (China). Both Shanghai and Chengdu revised
their Rules in 2008, bringing the relevant provisions in compliance with the State
OGI Regulations.
38. See Shenzhenshi Zhengfu Xinxi Wang Shang Gongkai Banfa (深圳市政府
信息网上公开办法) [Rules on Open Government Information on Internet of
Shenzhen Municipality] (promulgated by Executive Order No.130, Feb. 25, 2004,
effective April 1, 2004, superseded by Shenzhenshi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai
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Others listed comparatively abstract categories, such as “powers on
decision-making,” “fiscal administration,” or “personnel.”39
The 2003 State Regulations provided a uniform way of classifying
government information that should be open to the general public. It
first listed the type of information that should be disclosed by the
agency without request. This included, for example, information
“that involves the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or other
organizations,” “that needs to be extensively known or participated
in by the general public,” “that shows the structure, function and
working procedures of and other matters relating to the
administrative agency,” and “that should be disclosed on the
administrative agency’s own initiative according to laws, regulations
and relevant state provisions.” 40 The law then prescribed that
administrative agencies should “determine the concrete content of
the government information to be disclosed on their own initiative
within their scope of responsibility” 41 in accordance with the
provisions of Article 9 of the State OGI Regulations, and emphasized
disclosure of specific government information listed thereafter.42
3. Methods and Procedures for Disclosure
Both categories of information disclosure—upon an agency’s own
initiative, or from an agency pursuant to a request—are outlined in
the 2003 State Regulations. Article 15 states requirements for
information disclosure on an agency’s own initiative, through
government gazettes, official websites, press conferences,
newspapers and other publications, radio, and television. 43 State
archives and public libraries are required to make access to
government information convenient for the general public. Agencies
are also encouraged to set up materials request stations, information
bulletin boards, and electronic information screens to disclose
information.44 Agencies are responsible for releasing information that
Guiding (深圳市政府信息公开规定) [Rules on Open Government Information of
Shenzhen Municipality], Sept. 1, 2006) art. 7(X) (China).
39. See 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, art. 9.
40. See State OGI Regulations, supra note 35, art. 9.
41. See id. arts. 10, 12.
42. See id. arts. 11.
43. See id. art. 15.
44. See id. art. 16.
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they made or stored45 within twenty business days from the date that
it was generated or updated. 46 Moreover, agencies are required to
comply and publish OGI guides and catalogues, and to update them
in a timely manner.47
Request procedures are also provided, albeit in a primary form that
lacks sensitivity to every contingency. Such procedures include
format and content requirements,48 guidelines for responding under
different circumstances, 49 instructions for dealing with conflicts of
interests,50 response formatting requirements,51 and pricing.52
4. Supervision and Safeguards
Article 31 of the 2008 State Regulations requires annual reporting
by all agencies. 53 It elaborated to a certain extent upon other
comparatively abstract requirements such as “periodic inspection”54
by “the departments in charge of OGI work and supervision
agencies.”55 Compared to the simple statement of whistleblowing and
remedy in Article 33, liabilities caused by agencies’ violation of the
Regulations provided in Articles 34 and 35 are more detailed.56
45. See id. art. 17.
46. See id. art. 18.
47. See id. art. 19.
48. See id. art. 20 (requiring a written application, but allowing verbal requests
when it would be prohibitively difficult to apply in written form).
49. See id. arts. 21-22, 24 (signaling that differences arise depending on
whether or not it is government information to be disclosed, or when the
information does not exist).
50. See id. art. 23 (requiring the administrative agency to solicit a third party’s
opinion, and, if the third party disagrees with disclosure, the agency may not
disclose the information, unless the information serves the public interest).
51. See id. art. 26 (providing information in the format the applicant requires).
52. See id. arts. 27-28 (allowing the agencies to collect a processing fee for
their services).
53. See id. art. 31.
54. See id. art. 29 (mandating periodic inspection of information disclosure
work in various levels of government).
55. See id. art. 30 (giving the responsibility of supervising information
disclosure to “competent” governments).
56. Compare id. art. 33 (providing administrative reconsideration or
adjudication for whistleblowers), with id. arts. 34-35 (listing numerous crimes such
as failing to fulfill disclosure obligations, failing to update contents of previously
disclosed information, and charging fees in violation of relevant provisions,
together with detailed penalties for an administrative agency that violates the
Regulation).
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B. DEFICIENCIES
1. Limited Scope of Disclosure
Chapter II of the 2008 State OGI Regulations establishes the scope
of information that should be disclosed on an agency’s own
initiative. This chapter implies that there should be no disclosure
unless the matter explicitly meets criteria found therein. Serving as a
general statement on the scope of disclosure, Article 9 uses vague
phrases—such as “[information that] involves the vital interests of
citizens” and “[information that] needs to be extensively known or
participated in by the general public”—that leaves broad discretion
to custodial agencies, which are naturally inclined to not release their
information. 57 Similar phrases are found in Articles 10-12, which
give local governments the power to “determine the concrete content
of the government information to be disclosed on their own initiative
within their scope of responsibility.”58 “Information on the approval
and implementation of major construction projects” that should be
disclosed by government at the county level and above (Article
10(8)), for example, could be held up in a dispute over the meaning
of “major construction projects.”59 “Important and major matters in
urban and rural construction and management”60 and “information on
the construction of social and public interest institutions”61 are also
ambiguous phrases and it will be easy for agencies to keep the
requested information away from the general public.
2. Unclear Resolution of Conflicts of Interest
A conflict of interest is likely the toughest issue that an agency
will face when fulfilling an information disclosure request. Agencies
must withhold information that “involves state secrets, commercial
secrets or individual privacy.”62 Leaving the big issue of state secrets
aside, there are still exemptions on this withholding: the information
57. See id. art. 9 (stating that this kind of information must be disclosed, but
failing to provide examples).
58. See id. arts. 10-12.
59. See id. art. 10(8) (failing to provide guidance on what constitutes vital
information with regards to a major construction project).
60. See id. art. 11(1).
61. See id. art. 11(2).
62. See id. art. 14(4).

2011]

CHINESE OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

997

mentioned above “may be disclosed by administrative agencies with
the consent of the rightholder(s) or if administrative agencies believe
that non-disclosure might negatively impact the public interest.”63 It
is hard to imagine a serious dispute arising over whether a
rightholder gave consent, but disputes seem inevitable over the
meaning of “impact the public interest.”64 No procedure is provided
to guide any possible controversy over the meaning of “major
impact,” “public interest,” or more importantly, the balance between
the interests of public and private parties.
Deficiencies stemming from the absence of conflict resolution
procedures are evident in Article 23 of the State OGI Regulations,
where both grounds for a valid disclosure decision and the
procedural protection of privacy and trade secrets appear vague and
ambiguous. When agencies believe commercial secrets or privacy
might be implicated by a disclosure request, seeking a third party’s
opinion is always indispensable. What should be the grounds for
withholding the requested information when the third party claims
privacy or commercial secrets? The principle that “[i]f the third party
does not agree to have the information disclosed, the information
may not be disclosed” leaves both agencies and the third parties a
possible excuse for nondisclosure. That is, it is the opinion of the
rightholder(s), rather than the consideration of the agencies, that
stands as the official ground of declining a request.65
63. See id. (allowing disclosure upon the rightholder’s approval or his failure to
contest the disclosure).
64. Id.
65. On October 17, 2008, less than six months after the State OGI Regulations
had gone into effect, the Commodity Price Bureau of Zhengzhou, Henan Province,
denied Zhao Zhengjun’s request for disclosure of financial statements of the
Zhengzhou Heating Corp., the provider of heating service to the citizens of
Zhengzhou, because the statement contained commercial secrets. The People’s
Court of Zhongyuan District, Zhengzhou Municipality, Henan Province overturned
the Commodity Price Bureau’s decision on appeal, holding that third-party
objection is an insufficient basis for denial of a government information request.
See Zhao Zhengjun v. Zhengzhoushi Wujiaju (赵正军诉郑州市物价局) [Zhao
Zhengjun v. Zhengzhou Mun. Commodity Price Bureau] (Henan People’s Ct. Mar.
26, 2009) (China), available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200903/
26/350326.shtml. The court decision is unlikely to deter other agencies from
denying a disclosure request on similar ground for at least three reasons: (1) The
Chinese legal system, a civil law system, does not follow stare decisis; (2) a local
district court (basic People’s court in the Chinese court system) is unlikely to be
persuasive authority to other courts; and finally, (3) media coverage of the case
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If the third party’s opinion is not accepted, when should they be
informed by the decision-making agency? The State OGI
Regulations do not provide a clear answer. Article 14 states relevant
information “may be disclosed” without the consent of the
rightholder(s)—that is, the third party—“if agencies believe that” the
public interest may be involved.66 Article 23 states: “[The Agency]
should disclose the information and notify the third party in writing
of the content of the government information it has decided to
disclose and the reason therefore.” 67 Should an agency convey the
decision to the third party before the requested information was
disclosed to the requester, a sufficient remedy may still exist. But if
the third party learns of the decision simultaneously or after the
disclosure, damage could be unavoidable. Lacking the procedure of
reverse-FOIA litigation, the ambiguous language of Article 23 of the
State OGI could add confusion in dealing with interest conflicts.

III.GOVERNMENT POWER VERSUS PRIVATE
PARTY FREEDOM—A COMPARISON WITH U.S.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS
It is not difficult to list many differences in government
transparency between China and the United States. Comparisons like
this might be helpful to scholars who are unfamiliar with the
pertinent institutions of a foreign country, but not for the purpose of
a comparative law study. Comparison of the major differences, such
as ideals, scope of disclosure and compliance with other laws, and
the reason behind the different appearances may be helpful for
mutual understanding.

A. MAJOR DIFFERENCES
1. Openness Versus the Right to Know
The names of the major statutes on government transparency
illustrate the basic difference between the government information
policies of China and those of the United States. Chinese OGI
indicates that both lawyers and the general public were more interested in the
court’s result than its reasoning. Only time will tell.
66. See State OGI Regulations, supra note 35, art. 14.
67. See id. art. 23.
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suggests that government agencies “open” information by using their
administrative powers, whereas U.S. “freedom of information”
(“FOI”) emphasizes the right of “any person” to access government
information. With economic development being the overwhelming
motivation behind almost every institutional construction including
transparency in mid-1980s China, the inherent tension between
public power and private rights in this sensitive area was almost not
touched either by the general public or by immature lawyers and
academics. Participants in the early transparency movement focused
on “openness” as redress for the historically dominant tradition of
pervasive secrecy. Unlike the initiation of FOI in the United States,
where court precedent and scholarly discourse could support a “right
to know” claim, 68 early transparency experiments in China were
conducted by the collective work of villagers, enterprises, public
organizations, the governing political party, and government
agencies. No specific social class or organization like the U.S. press
in the 1950s stood up to represent the people’s right to know and
fight against the government’s power to control information. 69
Because all participants were concentrated on advocating and
carrying out the ideal of “openness,” common sense overwhelmed
conflicts of interest. Neither conflict between private rights and the
national interests nor that between different private rights was
considered seriously. Borrowing mainly from the United States, in
the early 2000s Chinese scholars began to mention the key phrase
“right to know” and tried to bring it into statutes via participating in
legislation. The 2003 Guangzhou Rules, drafted by the Office of
Legislation of Guangzhou Municipality in collaboration with law
school professors, 70 succeeded for not only being the first statute
68. See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO
KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
8, 9-14 (1999) (suggesting that the “right to know” is limited to the “right to
receive information,” derived from the First Amendment right to freedom of
information).
69. See id. at 14-18 (detailing the struggle the press encountered during the
1950s in retrieving information from the government); see also KENT COOPER,
THE RIGHT TO KNOW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE EVILS OF NEWS SUPPRESSION AND
PROPAGANDA xii-xiii (1956) (claiming responsibility for coining the phrase “right
to know” and defining it as a citizen‘s entitlement to “have access to the news,
fully and accurately presented”).
70. See LIU HENG (刘恒), ZHEHNGFU XINXI GONGKAI ZHIDU (政府信息公开
制 度 ) [OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION] 192-93 (2004) (reflecting on the
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(being local law according to Chinese Legislation Law) on
transparency, but also the first statute that announces the protection
of the right to know.71 Unfortunately, such a right is not found in the
State OGI Regulations.
2. Express Scope of Disclosure Versus Specific Exemptions
Instead of exempting certain information from disclosure, like the
U.S. Freedom of Information Act, the State OGI Regulations list
what may be disclosed.72 Agencies can not only limit the scope of
disclosure within the given list, but also enjoy broad discretion to
decide whether specific data even falls within the given list because
crucial definitions remain unsettled. Take, for example, Article 11(1)
of the State OGI Regulations, which permits disclosure of “important
and major matters in urban and rural construction and management”;
what is “important” or “major”? Of course this determination is left
to the discretion of the relevant agencies. Moreover, a list of
exemptions implies a presumption of disclosure, which tends to
satisfy the right to know, while a listed scope of disclosure implies
the withholding of information. Although the 2003 Guangzhou Rules
stated that disclosure of government information is a basic principal
while nondisclosure is reserved for exceptional cases,73 Guangzhou
principals were not transmitted to the 2008 State Regulations to have
countrywide effect.

collaboration between law professors and government agencies to draft the 2003
Guangzhou Rules).
71. See 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, art. 1 (stating as its purpose the
protection of “the right to know”).
72. Cf. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). The nine FOIA
exemptions are: (1) classified information; (2) information related solely to internal
personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) information specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute; (4) privileged and confidential trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person; (5) inter- or intraagency memos or letters which would not otherwise be available by law; (6)
personnel and medical files; (7) records or information compiled for law
enforcement if disclosure could interfere with enforcement proceedings, the right
to fair trial, disclose the identity of a confidential source, disclose techniques or
procedures or guidelines that would risk the circumvention of the law, or could
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; (8) information related to an
agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; and
(9) geological and geophysical information and data. Id.
73. See 2003 Guangzhou Rules, supra note 16, arts. 1, 6.
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3. Compliance with Other Laws and Regulations
Secrecy suppressed transparency in China until the mid-1980s,
when open administration blossomed from villages.74 State laws on
government secrecy were established long before local legislation on
OGI. The Law on Guarding State Secrets defined “state secrets”
broadly, to encompass “matters that affect the security and interests
of the state and, as specified by legal procedure, are entrusted to a
limited number of people for a given period of time.” 75 This
definition is illustrated with general categories of information such as
secrets “concerning major policy decisions on state affairs,” “secrets
in national economic and social development,” and “secrets of
political parties that conform with the provisions of the preceding
clause of this Article.”76 The amendments to the Law in 2010 made
the procedure of defining state secrets (classification) and
safeguarding them clearer and more practical. The general definition
of “state secrets,” however, remains almost untouched from the 1989
version.
Archives law helped keep more secrecy in a way that requires “the
administration and use of confidential archives, changes in their
security classification, [while] the declassification of such archives
must be effected according to the provisions of the laws and
administrative rules and regulations of the State regarding secrecy.” 77
At the state level, the average term of declassification of a document
kept by the State Archives is 30 years. 78 Although “archives
74. The first statute on government information in China after 1949 was the
Provisional Regulations on Safeguarding State Secrets (Baoshou Guojia Jimi
Zanxing Tiaoli (保守国家机密暂行条例)), promulgated by the State Council in
1951. The Regulations remained in effect until 1989, when the Law on Guarding
State Secrets was enacted. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia
Mimi Fa (保守国家秘密法) [Law on Guarding State Secrets] (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989,
revised April 29, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) (China), available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?id=1191.
75. Id. art. 2.
76. Id. art. 8(1), (4)-(5).
77. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dangan Fa ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 档 案 法 )
[Archives Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 5,
1987, effective Jan. 1, 1988, revised July 5, 1996) art. 14 (China), available at
http://saac.gov/cn/
article.do?method=view&id=ff8080811172649a8011729fc01ca0019.
78. See id. art. 19 (noting that information pertaining to economic, scientific,

1002

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26.4

repositories shall regularly publish catalogues of records that are
open to the public [and] create conditions and simplify procedures
for the convenient use of archives,” 79 the frequency of publishing
open catalogues is unclear. Access to archives that are not yet open
to the public is under the control of the National Archives and
competent authorities, 80 thus leaving broad discretion to
administrative agencies.
Balance between transparency and secrecy is indeed the core value
of FOI laws. There should be a series of laws and regulations
collaborating to maintain this balance. First, there should be laws and
regulations for OGI and open decision-making processes. Second,
secrecy should be maintained in a manner that does not jeopardize
privacy rights (mainly personal privacy and trade secrets). Third,
dispute settlement and remedy procedures should be provided. In the
United States, where a comparatively mature government
transparency system has been implemented, major statutes, such as
FOIA,81 the Government in the Sunshine Act,82 and the Privacy Act,83
function reciprocally to achieve the balance between transparency
and secrecy.84 Yet in China, where government secrecy has a strong
historical tradition and transparency is still in its early phases, OGI
legislation should be regarded as a kind of milestone of open
governance, thus making it possible for advancements in
transparency as well as in the balance between transparency and
secrecy. With the definition of “trade secrets” in the 1993 AntiUnfair Competition Law and the interpretation by the SAIC
afterwards, 85 protection of commercial interests related to
technological, and cultural topics may be declassified earlier than 30 years).
79. Id. (requiring that citizens and organizations possess lawful identification to
use the archives).
80. See id. art. 20.
81. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
82. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
83. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
84. Charles J. Wichmann, III, Note, Ridding FOIA of Those “Unanticipated
Consequences”: Repaving a Necessary Road to Freedom, 47 DUKE L.J. 1213,
1217 (1998) (informing that after the enactment of FOIA, the presumption in favor
of disclosure thereby required agencies to defend nondisclosure).
85. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人
民共 和国反不 正当 竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law] (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) art.
10(3) (China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?id=648;
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government information disclosure may get substantial legal basis.
Yet procedural deficiencies remain to be overcome. Protection of
privacy is a weak point in the absence of pertinent legislation. In
recent years, scholars have been advocating for a national law to
protect privacy or personal information. Open meetings are being
held in some cities on agencies’ own initiatives,86 which have been
lauded by the general public. This could be the overture of future
legislation on open government meetings.

B. MAIN FACTORS THAT MAKE THE DIFFERENCES
1. Who Plays the Leading Role
Unlike the FOI movement that took place in the United States
during the 1950s, led by the press as an agent for the people’s “right
to know”, 87 information disclosure in China has been mainly
conducted under the guidance of the government and the governing
political party, though it has been initiated from the bottom-up as
well. Although open information of villages and enterprises affairs
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s was not really concerned with
OGI, it warmed up the whole stage of transparency throughout the
country. Transparency in villages and enterprises is a kind of testing
or preparation for transparency in government agencies. That could
be a possible reason for a series of official documents following the
Guanyu Jinzhi Qinfan Shangye Mimi Xingwei de Ruogan Guiding (关于禁止侵犯
商业秘密行为的若干规定) [Certain Regulations of the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce on Prohibiting Infringements upon Trade Secrets (1998)]
(promulgated by No. 41 Executive Decree of the SAIC, Nov. 23, 1995, effective
the same day, revised by No. 86 Executive Decree of the SAIC, Nov. 23, 1998,
effective the same day), available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/e957404c2b
160b4e767fcf0f.html. Article 2 interpreted the term “trade secrets” explicitly.
86. In Dongguan city, Guangdong Province in South China, journalists from
local media were invited to sit in a meeting held by the City Government of
Dongguan on Dec. 17, 2005. That began the open meeting phase for this city.
Although auditors are still limited to local media, all meetings of the city
government except those dealing with personnel changes are open to journalists.
See Dongguan Shixing Touming Bangong Jian “Yangguang Zhengfu” (东莞实行
透明办公建“阳光政府”) [City of Dongguan Working to Implement Transparent,
“Sunshine Government”], NANFANG RIBAO (南方日报) [NANFANG DAILY] (Dec.
8, 2005), http://www.sun0769.com/news/dongguan/sz/t20051208_62534.htm.
87. See generally FOERSTEL, supra note 68, at 14-35 (outlining the history of
the right to know in the United States, including reactions from the press and the
government).
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unofficial transparency experiments, intentionally trying to guide the
further ongoing of the movement. When transparency came into
SOEs and public organizations, government information disclosure
was inevitably involved.
Government’s leading role can surely push the movement of
transparency forward faster, while it may also weaken contention
from civil society. The right to know is in fact the right to challenge
the power to control information, and transparency cannot be a
dominant principle without this challenge. When government
dominates the process for providing transparency, such transparency
becomes an ideal that relies largely on the self-restraint of the
government itself. It is easy to understand why the scope of
information disclosure tends to be narrow in this situation.
2. Ideal of Procedural Justice and Relevant Legislation
U.S. practice demonstrates that legislation of uniform
administrative procedure (the Administrative Procedure Act (APA))
not only provides general legal authority for agency action, but also
helps on secondary legislation, such as FOI laws and regulations.88
Constitutional principles of procedural justice are elaborated upon in
the APA, manifested by important guidelines on decision-making
and dispute resolution.89 If a principle of procedural due process is
not stated in a state or national constitution, as in the case of China,
administrative procedure statutes are necessary to provide that
process. Although the ideal of procedural justice has been embodied
in more and more statutes on administrative procedure, the absence
of a uniform law on administrative procedure adds to the difficulties
of framing as well as enacting OGI laws and regulations. The
obvious deficiency of Article 14 of China’s 2008 State Regulations
shows the fatal procedural weakness that has been clearly seen in
Zhao Zhengjun’s case, mentioned in Part II, footnote 66, of this
essay.90
88. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).
89. See id. §§ 556-557.
90. See State OGI Regulations, supra note 35, art. 14 (providing that Chinese
government agencies have the discretion to release information containing
commercial secrets or private facts “with the consent of the rightholder(s) or if
administrative agencies believe that non-disclosure might give rise to a major
impact on the public interest”).
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3. Judicial Review
In common law jurisdictions, judicial decisions can usually
overcome possible weaknesses of statutes. This also helps them to
deal with FOI cases more flexibly than civil law courts do.
Moreover, significant precedents can also be justification to create a
new statute, like what happened in the making of the U.S. FOIA.
Civil law courts like Chinese ones are usually much less active,
especially when resolving controversies involving new laws and
regulations, such as OGI laws. Procedural deficiencies in China’s
OGI statutes also obstruct progressive litigation. China’s
Administrative Litigation Law, enacted 20 years ago (in 1990), had
no specific provision on OGI-related litigation. On July 29, 2011, the
Chinese Supreme People’s Court promulgated a judicial
interpretation on OGI litigation. 91 This judicial interpretation
provides a clear legal guidance on accepting an OGI lawsuit, which
agency should be the defendant, the relevant burden of proof, and
what kind of judgment should be made under different
circumstances. 92 Unfortunately, it deals little with disclosure
procedure, and therefore does not influence the broad discretion
agencies enjoy in pertinent administrative procedure. Moreover, even
if judicial interpretation can make up for the procedural deficiencies
of the 2008 State Regulations, and provide more effective provisions
for courts all over the country, it will not be compulsory in
administrative procedures—courts are bound to the judicial
interpretations of the Chinese People’s Supreme Court, but
administrative agencies are not, unless their decision is brought to
court. Comparatively passive action of courts limited the reaction
from the judiciary branch, thus in turn reinforcing the power of the
administrative branch in building (or not building, as the case may
be) transparency.

91. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai
Xingzheng Anjian Ruogan Wenti De Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理政府信息
公开行政案件若干问题的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases About Open
Government Information] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, July
2011, effective Aug. 12, 2011) (China), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/
Display.aspx?lib=law&ID=8897.
92. See id. arts. 2-12.
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IV.LESSONS LEARNED
The need for the development of greater transparency in China has
aroused international concern recently for both economic and
political reasons. Reading legal provisions on OGI is an easy way to
get a first impression, though is insufficient to understand this newlyestablished institution in China. Reading the statutes through both
domestic and international contexts will be helpful to understand
transparency in China, as well as to comparative law studies.
First, domestic factors are crucial for the development of
transparency in China. Motivated by possible economic
achievements through openness (which is helpful to fair and
effective management of administration), the common sense of
openness was stressed, while conflicts between the right to know and
the power to control information were not paid enough attention to at
the early time of transparency development.
Second, local government has played (and is still playing) an
important role in building the institutions of government
transparency. Municipalities and provincial governments can
experiment with information disclosure more easily, and successful
local legislation can serve as a basis for future state legislation.
Third, careful attention should be paid to influences from
international law. Treaties and other international instruments, like
the WTO Agreement, can be the international legal source of China’s
OGI legislation in a sense that the principle of transparency itself is
not limited to the context of international trade, but rather extends to
all areas in which government regulation is involved. Experiences of
foreign countries also have a role to play, particularly as they help
form opinions held by influential scholars.
Fourth, an understanding of why these differences exist is more
important than an assessment of the legal provisions of different
countries under one (therefore simple) standard. Understanding
reasons for differences is helpful for making reasonable forecasts for
the future of a newly established institution in a developing country.
Finally, lumping democracy together with transparency may
appear to oversimplify the meaning and components of democracy.
Transparency is fundamental to every aspect of democracy,
including electoral procedure and public participation. But because it
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also lies as a stepping stone on the path to procedural fairness, or due
process, transparency is especially important in developing countries
like China, where the long journey towards democracy and the rule
of law began merely thirty years ago. Without a well-informed
citizenry, public participation is impossible; so too are fair elections.
Fueled by the information age, transparency is not only developing
faster than ever but like democracy, it is becoming harder to reverse.

